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I confirm what I have said, that there is a common opinion in the party, that there really 
is a closure to the right, that is, we do not believe that a left-right opposition, which 
would be fatal to our country and in which the DC would be unnaturally on the right and 
which would disrupt the equilibrium o f Italian political life, is useful, not so much for 
the fortunes o f our party, but useful to Christian Democracy Thus, in these circums­
tances, excluding this formula and the parties’ decisions remaining unchanged, the theme 
(o f the congress) is precisely the one which I have indicated, that is, the formula to 
which I do not see there is any concrete and stable political alternative.
A ldo Moro, Novem ber 1961, television interview.
If you have not understood the above, do not be alarmed. You have 
entered the Twilight Zone of Italian politics, the rhetorical dimension of 
ambiguity and of metonymic shifts that lead to political mythification in the 
Barthian sense.1 In this paper I will explore some aspects of the rhetorics of
1. “II faut ici rappeler que les matières de la parole mythique (langue proprement díte, photographie, 
peinture, affiche, rite, objet, etc.), pour differentes qu’elles soient audépart, et dés lors qu'elles 
sont sa isies par le mythe, se ramènent à une pure fonction signifiante: le mythe ne voit en 
elles qu’une même matière premiére leur unité, c ’est qu’elles sont réduites toutes au simple 
statut de langage. Q u’il s ’agisse de graphie littérale ou de graphie picturale, le mythe ne veut 
voir la qu ’un total de signes, q u ’un signe global, le terme final d ’une prem iére chaine 
sém iologique. Et c ’est précisément ce terme final qui va devenir premier terme ou terme partiel 
du systém e agrandi qu’il édifie. Tout se passe com m e si le mythe décalait d’un eran le systéme  
formel des premiéres significations” (Barthes, 1957; 199).
Anuário Antropológico/2000-2001
Rio de Janeiro: Tempo Brasileiro, 2003: 215-234
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citizenship and of individual rights in the Italian context, arguing that State 
threats to individual rights do not emerge as a reaction to demands for political 
and moral legitimacy by ethnic minorities (the “progressive” position, as is 
sometimes asserted in the literature), nor as a repressive attempt to deal with 
the contamination of political spaces by persistent “cultural” traditions such 
as family, patronage, clientelism, corruption, etc. (the “regressive” position). 
Instead, I argue that the core problem in reconciling definitions of citizenship 
and definitions of the self is the inability of the Italian State to localise and 
give meaningful content to definitions of the citizen, especially through its 
use of a particular rhetoric stressing personalised values such as duty and 
honour. In an attempt to reconcile the citizen and the individual, the State 
has appropriated the rhetorical forms of Catholic morality, transforming the 
notion of citizenship into a ritual linguistic space in which rights fail to be 
defined because the space is devoid of semiotic referents to local identities.2 
On the other hand, citizens appropriate one of the State’s strongest metaphors, 
the notion of society as a social body, and give it new meaning, la Patria, in 
order to express their sense of distance and dissatisfaction, as well as to 
personalise the otherwise sterile notion of citizenship.
In Italy, the dominant view of politics is that it is something corrupt 
and corrupting, creating a huge gulf between what is viewed as the pure, 
intimate, private and genuine self and the dirty, public, masked and false self 
of citizenship. All social classes feel that the central government is failing 
and has failed since 1948 to provide citizens with any means of effective, 
institutionalised political participation. In other words, most Italian citizens 
see themselves as disempowered vis-à-vis the State, and I would like here to 
raise a few issues about the metaphorical basis of political rhetoric that 
surrounds this situation. In particular, I would like to address the issue of 
why Italian political rhetoric is singularly unpersuasive in its repeated appeals 
to individualised values such as honour and duty; that is, when it is not 
sending oblique messages about the rules of the political game. 1 would 
caution that these are superficial and preliminary comments because of the 
complexity of the subject and the difficulty in escaping ideologically- 
sanctioned analyses that are in fact little more than built-in programmatic
2. I cannot in this lim ited space detail the com plex relationship between the Vatican and the 
Italian State (and its antecedent statelets), but I would in fact argue that the relationship o f  state 
and Vatican rhetoric is more akin to a vicious circle than a sim ple act o f appropriation.
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m uques that are part of most Western political ideologies. I would also 
million that in English I am unable to provide more than a general overview 
..I some characteristics of Italian political rhetoric, since translations from 
Italian would be pointless, as my opening example shows.
Indirect speech and structured ambiguity
Given common Italian stereotypes of their national character, that
11 icy are voluble, expressive, and slaves to their hot Latin blood, one would 
expect Italian political rhetoric to use such facile icons, especially since Italy 
is relatively homogeneous in terms of ethnicity, religion, and language. 
Furthermore, state building processes in Italy have been relatively successful 
since the Fascist era, considering the political problems posed by huge 
differences in history, dialect and local cultures among its regions. Even 
more interesting is that from the Fascist era onwards, political rhetoric has 
avoided the m ajor metaphors with which other Western states have 
constructed their representational engines, namely, icons of blood, descent 
and ethnicity (although these sometimes have their local uses, for example, 
on posters in police stations). The problem facing the Italian State is that 
political rhetoric inadvertently channelled individual feelings of ethnic or 
cultural identity away from identity signs that might have led to the 
valorisation of State institutional processes; in other words, the State has 
been unable to provide institutionalised referents for pre-existing values.
It is possible that the absence of these icons in political rhetoric is 
responsible for the fact that there has been surprisingly little research by 
linguists, political scientists and anthropologists along these lines. In fact, 
there is only one extant analysis of political rhetoric in a modern key, by
!. 1 am aware, o f course, that language is a thorny theoretical issue when drawing the contours o f  
national identity, and especially in Italy, where illiteracy and regional dialects were widespread. 
However, all governm ents since the Fascist era have been successful in im posing standard 
Italian as'the national language. Because this process was com pleted relatively late compared 
to other Western European nations, dialects are not used by people as tokens ot political identity 
except by supporters o f Northern separation.
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political scientist Giorgio Fedel.4 His argument ties Italian rhetoric to the 
political institutions of elections and in particular to the rituals of forming 
the executive branch of government. His main conclusion appears to be 
intuitively correct, that Italian political rhetoric differs substantially from its 
English and German counterparts by its constant appeals to the rules of the 
system rather than to ideological principles that can, in other nations, be tied 
to subtexts that define the Self and the Collectivity by means of the metaphor 
of shared blood. In brief, Italian political rhetoric is a discourse of warnings 
and comments on the process of managing power, in which the citizenry is 
viewed as a passive participant. When appeals are made to ideological 
principles stressing unity, these are extremely abstract and mostly consist of 
references to individualised morality such as duty, sacrifice and honour.
In fact, political rhetoric is often a form of speech indirection, as years 
of research on langue de bois or zaum ’have attested, and this is what Fedel’s 
analysis reveals:5 the ostensible audience, whether this be parliamentarians 
or citizens at large, is often not the intended audience of the speaker; messages 
are often obliquely redirected to others. Various types of indirection are the 
use of particular tones, grammatical forms, specialised vocabularies or 
cadences when speaking (for example, the Plains Indian falsetto when chiefs 
make political speeches that perforce invoke notions of hierarchy that are 
normally anathema to these people). By limiting the range of tones, cadences, 
grammar or the semantic field on these important occasions, speakers create 
a ritual linguistic field in which the semiotic charge of the lexemes is 
simultaneously lessened (because in ritual spaces, the link between signifier 
and signified is broken) and heightened (because in ritual spaces, these 
relatively denatured and impoverished signs acquire their signifieds within 
the ritual field and can become metonyms). The result of indirection is that 
advocacy and authority are detached from culturally-specific notions of in­
dividual agency, and it is less clear to the public that a politician is speaking 
of his own self interests or from a privileged position. The indirect nature of 
Italian political speech is attested by the tortuous grammar of declarations
4. There are others, but not dealing with contemporary rhetoric. Cf. Desideri (1984), which mostly 
analyses M ussolini's speechifying in very classical terms. Only Fedel (1999) applies a theoretical 
model to modern Italian rhetoric.
5. For an analysis o f  formal speech and indirection in a Native North American context see Lanoue 
(1991).
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llial invoke la democrazia in order to not give explicit voice to the enormous 
difference in political power between the elite and the citizenry; in the Italian 
mntext, the passage I have reproduced above is perhaps one of the most 
I*.hiring examples but one could (as does Fedel) provide numerous examples.
There are two institutional aspects of the Italian political system that 
account for the indirect nature of rhetoric, according to Fedel: the first is the 
I’arty system and the second is the manner in which the executive arm of 
I he government is formed. I will briefly review each of these points in order 
lo establish the contrast to my own position.
Although Italy is a parliamentary democracy, its many political parties 
and system  o f indirect proportional representation for a portion of 
Parliamentary seats make it unique among Western industrialised countries. 
As in all parliamentary systems, the executive arm of the government, in 
practice the cabinet, must have the confidence of parliament in order to 
formulate and propose laws. However, no single party has ever captured 
more than 50% of the popular vote or of parliamentary seats since the birth 
of the post-War Republic in 1948. All governments since that date have 
therefore been based on political coalitions. As a consequence, political parties 
are not so much ideological rallying points as they are associations of individuals, 
each acting as a power broker to his or her own clients and each seeking to 
augment his or her power while more or less agreeing to leave untouched the 
rights and privileges of other Party members. They are, in other words, self- 
help associations to a degree not seen elsewhere in the West. As such, they are 
extremely flexible and pragmatic on the political and rhetorical levels; as a rule 
they crave as much power as they can obtain through strategic coalitions, and 
the only real limits on the extent they are willing to compromise their publicly 
announced ideological position is in fact the extent that their electorates will 
accept sudden and radical political shifts, which they will if the payoff is to 
their economic advantage (for example, 60% of the adult population receives 
government pensions in one form or another).6 Hence, most attempts to justify
6. Italians often use the word fesso  to describe politically  ingenuous attitudes, people who 
uncritically believe in purified and rarified ideological and cultural positions (e.g ., communists 
are democratic”, “work is dignified"); the closest English translation is dolt . For a discussion  
o f fesso and its opposite, furbo (cunning), see Barzini (1966: 166); the date o f the reference is 
itself indicative o f  how deeply-rooted this mistrust o f rhetoric is in Italian popular culture. Plus 
ça change.
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their participation in an uneasy political coalition will strike a rhetorical balan­
ce between, on the one hand, giving their supporters a veiled, public message 
that their strategic interests are safe and, on the other, maintaining public integrity 
with that small but vocal segment of the electorate that supports them on the 
basis of ideology.7 Again, I would cite Aldo Moro’s ambiguous speech as a 
prime example of this paradox that must be resolved through rhetorical 
indirection, in which the message, ostensibly public, was to members of his 
own party, the dominant Christian Democrats who wanted to exclude the Left 
from the executive arm; Moro had become convinced that the only viable way 
to keep Christian Democrat ideals and interests alive was to attempt an 
ideological merger and a political coalition with the Left.8
The second institutional factor to keep in mind is the manner by which 
coalitions are formed and how these are ratified by Parliament. Neither the 
President nor the Prime Minister is directly elected by popular vote. Since 
no party ever has an absolute majority, the President must call upon the 
party leader he feels will most likely survive a vote of confidence. This 
follows a series of consultations with the leaders of all major political parties 
(in practice this means all parties that obtain more than 5% of the popular 
vote, which means a great deal of consultation and deal-making takes place 
between elections and the President’s announcement since the political 
coalitions of the past are no guarantee of solidarity in the present). The
7. I am not suggesting that this segm ent oi the voters necessarily blindly believes the ideological 
position ot political parties but that they in tact invoke and attribute ideological positions to the 
parties on the basis o f local and private self-interest. Ideology in this sense is “bottom-driven”, 
although I cannot exam ine this issue here. In support o f my assertion, I can cite the Socialist 
Party’s o f  Italy’s (PSI) shift away from socialist principles in the late 1970s under Party leader 
and later Prime M inister Bettino Craxi. N o one appeared troubled when the PSI adopted a 
centrist, neo-liberal position on most major issues (even becom ing anti-com m unist) while  
continuing to assert its right to use past Socialist icons (anti-Fascist, anti-monarchial, anti- 
Catholic) in its rhetorical facade. The change was heralded as a step towards “modernisation” 
o f the paity, when in fact it was an attempt to reach a more more powerful electorate that had 
been inelevant at the time of the party s foundation in the 1800s, the growing professional and 
enterpreneurial class.
8. In 1963, Moro managed to include som e Socialists in his Cabinet. He was later kidnapped and 
killed by the left-wing Red Brigade terrorists in 1978, two years after he had left the Prime 
M inister’s office, and one year after Communists finally entered the Cabinet; many believe  
M oro was targeted precisely for the victory o f  his view s since a corporatist Cabinet with 
Communist Party representation undermined the Red Brigade’s strategy o f polarisation.
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designated leader then presents to Parliament the names of his proposed 
ministers, a list that is the outcome of the feverish political negotiations 
between party leaders who have agreed (or not) to participate in the 
government in return for first class seats on the patronage gravy train. It is 
only then that the would-be Prime Minister faces a vote of confidence and is 
confirmed or rejected by Parliament. My point is that political rhetoric, 
especially the speeches of the proposed Prime Minister, while officially 
addressing the nation and formally resembling the English Speech from the 
Throne, in fact indirectly address the Parliamentary electorate in an attempt 
to ensure that the proposed government will survive the vote of confidence. 
It is important to remember my first point about the nature of Italian political 
parties: because of proportional representation, parliamentarians feel little 
loyalty towards their electoral districts. They were not elected to represent 
the district but to channel centralised power towards selected local interests.1' 
Therefore, there is no sense of party discipline in the English or American 
sense, and even members of the proposed Prime Minister’s own party could 
and sometimes do vote against the proposed list of cabinet ministers. Political 
rhetoric will once again reflect ambiguous aims: on the one hand, the gene­
ral electorate is reassured that the public interest is best served by the proposed 
coalition, and on the other, there are oblique messages that simultaneously 
reassure members of one’s own party that their power will not be unduly 
diluted by the coalition and thinly veiled threats to parliamentarians of other 
parties that they must make good on their promises to publicly support the 
government if they privately agreed to participate in the coalition. Seven­
time Prime Minister Giuleo Andreotti, now doing commercials for a credit 
card company (D iner’s C lub),10 was considered a past master of this
9 . The number o f  Italians who can identify their local Deputy is strikingly small even when 
compared to the United States or to Canada, both countries well known for political apathy by 
the electorate. It is important to know politicians if one w ishes to obtain favours, but not 
necessarily the politician who represents the Riding.
10. The theme o f  the com m ercials consists o f  Andreotti saying And 1 thought I ’d seen everything, 
in reference to the extent o f  services now available to cardholders. This is an ironic teference to 
what most people suspected had been the basis o f Andreotti’s virtual stranglehold on power for 
over 30 years, that he had secret files (partially obtained in collusion with the Catholic Church) 
docum enting the weaknesses o f his rivals. In a sense, these commercials are an exam ple of self- 
referential iteration o f the political rhetoric for which Andreotti was renowned, the veiled threat.
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simultaneously reassuring and menacing rhetoric. In brief, the structural 
peculiarities of the institutional arrangements are such that they can explain 
some features of this rhetoric, especially its constant appeals to the rules of 
the game at the expense of appeals to ideology, as Fedel has ably noted.
However, I think that this analysis, admirable in itself, is incomplete 
because it ignores the polysemic aspects of many of these rhetorical signs -  
“safeguarding democracy”, for example, not to mention “honour” and “duty” 
in a Catholic country, and especially the trope of society as a social body 
metaphorised by means of the family; I shall return to this below. Fedel’s 
structural approach fails to take account of how the signs are used 
meaningfully by citizens in their daily strategies of social positioning. In 
other words, I think that the rhetoric of politics is linked to how people constitute 
themselves socially in non-political dimensions. Politicians are not people who 
were bom on another planet; it only seems that way sometimes.
Essential truths
As Michael Herzfeld points out in Cultural Intimacy (1997), rhetoric 
is not only an artificial form of speech full of bombast and hollow images 
touching the political arena but is the politics of persuasion that pervades all 
aspects of social positioning. As such, approaches such as Fedel’s that try to 
link institutional forms to the semantics of political speech, while certainly 
not wrong, ignore that the politics of persuasion and the social tensions these 
engage provide the same raw semiotic material to all participants in forums 
beyond the political arena. In particular, more than any other strategy of 
social positioning (no matter the intended target) political rhetoric seeks to 
convince by appeals to unmoveable, unquestionable and immutable truths, 
whether these be shared ethnicity, views of political freedom, or notions of 
social justice. Although almost no one accepts these as unalterable truths in 
private, very few would willing risk weakening their status position by stating 
as such in public because, in fact, these “hollow” images define the relatively 
neutral ritual space in which conflicting individual interests can be delocalised 
and subjected to a process of negotiation with impunity for social actors
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who invoke the iconic and partially denatured signs within rhetorical space.11 
The analytical problem when dealing with political rhetoric is to identify the 
I ruth statements to which it appeals and the semiotic basis of their efficacy 
or, in other words, analyse how a highly abstract and limited semantic field 
can easily serve opposed strategic purposes.
Rhetoric appeals to truths that are essentialised by the ritualisation of 
the commonplace, and by ritualisation I mean the elimination of unwanted 
signs in a determined social or linguistic space by one of two methods (they 
are not mutually exclusive): either by constant repetition of a few gestures 
or words, which makes it virtually impossible that other signs are incorporated 
into the ritual field; or by strict adherence to a formula of behaviour, speech 
or even thought, which has the same effect as the first. Signs within the 
space that survive the purging of other elements increase their semiotic charge 
precisely because they find their primary signifieds within the field and no 
longer outside it (though this meaning is not lost altogether: the host in 
Catholic mass is still bread, and everyone knows it).
The ritual field of Italian rhetoric is dominated by two elements, the 
idea of the historical past in political rhetoric and the semi-corporeal notion 
of la Patria in popular discourses.121 suggest that in Italy, people consider 
political rhetoric ineffective precisely because it appeals to extremely abstract 
values which indirectly implicate notions of the individual at the most intimate 
level, the body and especially the sexual body. This not only ignores the 
standard metaphorical array of blood and descent, it infringes on individual 
and local representations of the sexuali sed body and the family. In other 
words, two metonymic shifts are involved when political rhetoric is 
incorporated into popular discourse: first, the metaphor of blood is not
11. It is not surprising that many liberal positions that attack these Western fundaments are upper 
class, that is, protected by status markers other than the prevailing political rhetoric, by the 
same token blind patriotism is usually the political calling call o f  the lower middle and lower 
classes since they possess less cultural capital in Bourdieu’s sense.
12. Another w ay o f looking at this is through the notion o f purity, which, as Herzfeld and many others 
have noted, is a central feature o f states, concerned as they are with essence expressed through 
ethnicity. Obviously, by placing the quotidian in a ritual field and thereby eliminating other elements, 
purity is achieved. However, I am concerned with establishing what happens within the ritual 
field. In this sense, I think ritualisation may be a common thread that links what happens in North 
American vision quests, for example, and the processes o f rhetorical and sem iotic consolidation 
that are typical o f nation-states.
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metonymically shifted to the dead blood of agnatic descent in the past but to 
the hot blood of sex and in particular to the future, as evoked by the trope of 
sexual reproduction; second, the political non-compliance and the semiotic 
autonomy of the citizenry is signalled by removing the dimension of descent 
from the immediate historical past of the nation and by placing it in the 
mythical past of la Patria and its cultural attributes, referred to as civiltà, 
which can be roughly translated as capital-C culture, or by its behavioural 
expression, perbenismo, sometimes translated by the term “breeding”.
The past and the present
As we know, all Western governments seek a measure of legitimacy 
in the past, largely because if they control representations of the past they 
limit the possibilities of political dissent in the present. In other words, by 
reducing some aspects of social practice to cultural essence, they ritualise 
and therefore limit the possibilities of political deviance because they 
institutionalise the process of becoming deviant: no individual Self fits 
perfectly into the metaphoric social body, whose hermetic perfection is 
attested by its having survived the passage of time and the political 
machinations of very different political regimes.
However, Italy is a peculiar case because the social body united by the 
blood of descent is transmuted to other forms: male maschismo and female 
Madonnas. Indeed, blood is played out only at the local level in terms of the 
family, and by concretising the family as a locus of personalised social intimacy, 
the Italian constitution of 1948 paradoxically precludes that this sign can emer­
ge in nationalising discourses, unlike, for example, in the United States. I suspect 
that blood and its related metonym of agnatic descent are avoided in political 
rhetoric precisely because the Italian past is a semiotic minefield that no 
government nor state institution can effectively dominate since, unlike other 
Western states, Italian state processes and their history are not inscribed with 
bourgeois values bom relatively recently in the late 18th century and enshrined 
after the political repressions of 1848. The class whose values should have 
served as an iconic model for a modern state never dominated the process of 
state formation. This is largely due to the retrograde influence of the Vatican.
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State processes in Italy were and are exceptional by Western European 
standards, and Rome was and is exceptional even by Italian standards. There 
are many reasons for this, but what is important are not the ‘facts’ as such 
but that these elements have been inscribed in the Roman politics of 
memory:13 a) the 1150-year presence of the Vatican (from 728, when the 
lown of Sutri, 50 km north of Rome, was donated to Gregory II by the 
Longbard king Liutprand, to 1870, when Rome was conquered by Italian 
troops) as a secular ruler and as an active agent in the suppression of, first, 
republican values (from the 13th century) and, later, liberal ideologies (from 
the 17th century onwards), and all this has entailed for social positioning 
strategies, economic development and semiotic processes attached to values 
within institutionalised spaces; b) Italian views of the weight of the Imperial 
and Renaissance pasts interrupted by a nearly nine hundred-year hiatus in 
Italian civiltà (from the Barbarian invasions beginning in the fourth century 
to the emergence of republican city states in the 12th century) and by a 300 
year period of stasis (the Counter Reformation and its negative effects on 
liberal social movements and discourses); c) finally, the absence of Italian 
and especially of Roman precedents for liberal-democratic statehood; unlike 
most northern Italian cities, Rome did not develop a republican comune in 
the late Middle Ages that effectively undermined Vatican control.14 In the 
construction of social ideology (which includes justifications for failures 
and explanations for successes in the politics of social positioning), individuals 
often cite the combination of an oppressive Church, shifts in the temporal 
dimension from the tangible past of history to the mythic past of civiltà, and 
weak liberal-democratic values that combined to limit bourgeois control of state 
institutions and especially to curtail bourgeois influence on state ideologies and 
their representations. The Vatican never favoured nor even permitted the open 
social and geographic borders required by bourgeois mercantile and financial 
activities, not to mention that it actively opposed all attempts to dilute its social 
and political privileges. Like all such processes of temporal and causal invocation,
13. A s Pandolfi points in her cogent and thought-provoking analysis o f the so-called “ Southern 
question” in Italy (Pandolfi, 1998).
14. In Rom e, the com une was briefly established by Cola di Rienzo, w hose republican ideals were 
quickly contaminated by religious and feudal ideas: he came to think o f him self as a divine 
ruler and was quickly dethroned and killed by the Roman mob.
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these “historical” elements are “true” insofar as they resonate with commonly- 
distributed (in schools, newspapers, etc.) theses in Italian rhetorical practices.
As a result, the limited ranks of the bourgeoisie were filled by people 
with two opposed social origins, the low-ranking rural aristocracy who could 
operate at some distance from the Vatican but whose economic base was 
non-bourgeois land rents, and urban providers of goods and services to the 
Vatican and to pilgrims.15 Ironically, the limited social and economic space 
of the urban bourgeoisie meant these disparate individuals came to share a 
common obsession: rural estates, where one could retire in times of unrest 
and from which one could collect land rent from landless peasants who until 
the beginning of the 20th century may have represented as much as 80 percent 
of the population, and urban property holdings from which the bourgeoisie 
could collect rents, conduct its limited business activities, and especially 
launch its political stratagems designed to penetrate the Vatican Curia.16 In 
other words, the northern Italian liberalisation of the 13th and 14th centuries 
that led to the Renaissance was followed by a growing tendency towards 
what can only be called semiotic feudalisation, since the growing bourgeois 
attachment to land is not an atavistic survival but a relatively modern by­
product of Vatican dominance. Liberalisation was also followed by a 
retrograde (by northern European standards) political and economic stasis 
manifested in cultural bigotry towards lower classes and in a right-wing 
disdain for liberal politics when these finally emerged in the last quarter of 
the 19th century. But more than anything else, the closure of the bourgeoisie
15. From the M iddle A ges and especially during lhe Counter Reformation, the Vatican exercised its 
power over the locals, especially over the nascent bourgeoisie as providers o f  goods and services 
to pilgrim s, by using pilgrims as a threat: at least one Jubilee Year was cancelled to punish the 
Romans, not to mention the discretionary power o f  the Popes and the Curia to hold public 
rituals and decide the degree o f  ostentation.
16. Lazio, especially  the 50-60 km. belt surrounding Rome, was devastated in the late Imperial 
period by the very richness and power o f Rome. Although the earth is fertile, its is low -lying  
(downtown Rome is a mere 19 metres above sea level) and swampy in many places. The various 
drainage and irrigation system s ot the Republic, which had been effective in controlling runoff 
and the millennium-old scourge of malaria, were abandoned as Roman power grew and foodstuffs 
were increasingly imported. This and the presence o f the Vatican aristocracy created the latifundia 
system , in which peasants were not small freeholders but tenant farmers. It is only towards the 
19th century that various drainage system s were once again installed and the land became 
productive, with new villages and a small freeholding peasant class encouraged by the Italian 
state, largely to counter the power o f the pro-Vatican landed aristocracy.
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meant that it sought to appropriate signs of cultural and social privilege that 
could not be imitated by others, and it also means that the nascent Italian 
bourgeoisie was not desirous of the permeable political, social and cultural 
frontiers that, in other Western countries, became the ethical basis for national 
(bourgeois) constitutions. In brief, in Italy the past is used as a means of 
achieving a closed metaphoric field, especially of signs referring to the 
bourgeoisie, and this trait is writ large on the political rhetoric of the Italian 
slate: the abstract quality and very limited semantic field of Italian political 
rhetoric is a consequence of the absence of past political elements (referring 
for the most part to bourgeois processes of liberalisation) that can act as 
signifieds for contemporary bourgeois, State-sponsored neo-liberalism. The 
past is therefore far from being semiotically unassailable. This ambiguity is 
maintained by the citizenry’s constant denigration of the State and its political 
institutions, which effectively counteracts any State attempts to identify non- 
negotiable truth statements, leaving the rhetorical field of national identity 
oven more limited in political rhetoric, and the possibilities endless for indi­
vidual social positioning in popular discourses.
When seeking to mine the past to construct the present, for all the 
alleged richness of its historical ores, the relative newness of the Italian state 
and especially its failure to create rhetorical points of conjunction with its 
citizens has resulted in a paradox when Italians speak of or to the past: on 
llie one hand, the visible remains of history -  Roman ruins and school 
curricula that emphasise Imperial Rome as the apogee of civilisation, and 
recent personal memories of the Fascist imperialist agenda -  are everywhere 
present, obviating the need for inventing the ethnic histories of glorious excess 
that typify many peoples whose forms of statehood are weak players on the 
world political stage; on the other, modem state ideologies are particularly 
shallow and meaningless abstractions to many Italians, creating spectacular 
potholes on the road to temporal self-realisation within institutional spaces. 
And neither can these obstacles be avoided: ironically, institutions of social, 
political and rhetorical control (the bureaucracy and a historicising discourse) 
have infiltrated all dimensions of personal spaces in Italy precisely because 
there has never been a clearly Italian project of the state: Cavour, Mazzini, and 
even Alcide de Gasperi, the first post-War Prime Minister, were liberal democrats 
(and aristocrats, except for de Gasperi) who sought their inspiration abroad, in 
mostly French and Austrian models since they, like contemporary Italians, were 
convinced that Italian political traditions were corrupt and second-rate.
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Yol not all attempts to situate oneself in the past, ambiguous and 
diliicull as these might be, involve the creation of positive links to semiotic 
beacons such as Imperial Rome and the Renaissance. There are also negative 
links to the past, a shared sense that the Italian past is a history of oppression, 
ol loss, of invasion, of exile, of despair. Consequently, one can legitimately 
speak of the past as a neutral semiotic field, in which individual items are 
nonetheless highly charged in either positive or negative terms; for each 
glory of Italian civiltà, for each Renaissance masterpiece, for each beautiful 
garden hidden in Roman courtyards, there is an invasion, a bombardment 
that destroyed family property, a family member exiled or killed, a dramatic 
reversal of fortune. Since the past, and especially the historical past of the 
nazione as opposed to the mythical past of civiltà, is not all glorious in popu­
lar consciousness, its frontiers become as permeable as its contents are varied. 
The very ease with which one can recover and “discover” (read, invent) 
signs linking one to the mythical past, combined with the semiotic closure 
of the upper classes, makes such a journey obligatory; a person without 
civiltà, without a mythical history, is a person with no social identity, just as 
Italy without a shared national past becomes, in popular discourse, a country 
with no identifiable political identity. The metonymic inversion between 
person and statehood -  one’s personal past in the semiotics of civiltà and the 
country’s recent past of failed nazionalità -  is negotiated by means of 
the metaphor of la Patria interpreted as organic bodily urges.
The land of the father
In discourse, almost no one uses “nation” ; Italy is either il paese 
( country , which is also used for “village”) or la Patria. Significantly, 
political rhetoric uses paese while people use la Patria. All Western countries 
to some extent use this trope and have more than faint echoes of patriarchal 
values that imbibe their social and political institutions, but no one compa­
res to the country of the Madonna complex for the power and pervasive 
nature of the father archetype as metaphor for the body, and the potent male 
body as the metaphor for society (and the female body as metaphor of the 
family; in fact, Italian male machismo could be seen, tongue firmly in cheek,
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as an exaggerated reaction to female domination of private spaces).17 Nowhere 
is patriarchal authority more present than in the centuries-old rhetoric of the 
Vatican and its subsequent influence on Italian political values and thought; 
nowhere is patriarchal authority more absent than in the popular metaphoric 
uses of the body trope. Here, it is nature that wins over politics, sex over 
patriarchical authority.
As many others have noted (see especially Herzfeld, 1987 and 1993), 
compared to bands and tribes, the metaphoric field of shared representations in 
nation-states is considerably narrowed. The process of narrowing is not only 
historical and functional -  the need to deploy very abstract signs to integrate 
ever larger numbers of people divided by geography, class, origins and race -  
but metonymic: in nation-states, signifiers become signifieds not within a ritual 
Held composed of several elements, which eventually allow the metonymic 
shifts typical of mythical logic in bands and in tribes, but within limited semantic 
fields composed of only one metaphor, the body and its blood, which 
encompasses the signified within the signifier. Metaphorically, these signs stand 
for the collective but metonymically they refer to themselves individually; for 
example, fatherland or its equivalents, in most European languages is marked 
for gender; a grammatically feminine word with a masculine semantico-lexical 
content, containing thus two metaphoric fields within the same sign, public 
spaces which are male and private spaces which are female.18 To a certain extent 
the hermetic nature of the dominant icons is preserved by adding a temporal 
dimension which, ironically, makes these icons timeless: placing the origins of 
these shared metaphoric representations of the collectivity in the past makes 
the field all the more impervious to possible metonymic shifts that would
17. In this context, see  I. M agli, Per una rivoluzione italiana (1996), a quite extraordinary book for 
its logical leaps and sim ple v iew s o f culture and society, yet that consistently uses the body as 
a trope that refers to abstract political Power (everywhere capitalised). However, Magli is however 
highly critical o f  the slate and it is not surprising that she does not use the rhetorical signs o f  the 
elite when discussing power.
18. In Russian, the link is more subtle: rodina is feminine with no direct reference to “father” but it 
is based on rod, clan or line, which is grammatically masculine and metaphorically patrilineal. 
In German, vaterland and mütterreich are both grammatically neutral but obviously marked by 
their lexical com ponents, one masculine and the other feminine: two words that share the same 
signified and thus the same metaphoric doubling as their French and Italian counterparts. Delaney 
reports (1995: 177) a parallel situation in Turkish, Devlet Baba ( ‘Father State’) and Anavatan 
(“ motherland” ).
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legitimate other, alternative metaphors in the present. The code shifts that 
metonymy normally makes possible between, for example, physiological 
and meteorological processes in so-called primitive myth, are in the mytho- 
logicof the nation-state m etaphorically active only in the past and 
metonymically static in the present.
However, these icons are polysemic so some shifts from one domain 
to another should be feasible. In fact, shifts occur but not metonymically 
from one domain to another but metaphorically within the m etaphor’s 
semantic field. The metaphoric body of the nation is metonymically a 
geographic code that mirrors the political shift from north to centre (from 
Milan to Rome), and from centre to north metaphorically (torso to head). 
Since the shifts are within the same metaphoric field, the Italian social body 
is prone rather than standing (which is also a fitting irony for popular views 
of its political incarnation, la nazione), and popular appeals to the values of 
la patria involve a northern shift, a Roman appropriation of the northern 
“head” by the central “guts” . Not to stretch a semiotic point too much, but 
Northern League critiques of Roman governm ent literally use this 
physiological m etaphor when speaking of their disproportionate tax 
contribution to the state -  Rome "cats” everything -  not to mention the 
widespread usage of “eat” to describe Roman political corruption; and as 
one moves geographically and metaphorically farther south, it is not surprising 
to find in popular discourses a preponderance of stereotypes accenting 
southern male sexual potency, as one does in nearly all Western countries 
that use the corporeal metaphor. However, in Italy these metaphors rarely 
find their way into political rhetoric precisely because of the enormous gulf 
between explicit signifiers in the present and implicit signifieds in the past 
that 1 have mentioned above.
By naturalising the body, people create an apparently a fixed reference 
point from which all else appears as symbolic, as Butler suggests in her 
brilliant book Bodies that M atter (Butler, 1993). In other words, if 
naturalisation imposes limits on signification within the imaginary, then it 
imposes limits on all processes of signification by defining what is signifiable 
and what is not. Naturalising the body by exagerrating or calling excessive 
attention to its sexual dimension therefore distinguishes the signifiable from 
the non-signifiable, and this means that the essentialising strategies of the 
State (which are presented as as the symbolic representation of society) create 
their own boundary condition. Similarly, citizens who sexualise and thus
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underline the body’s “naturalness” do so in part because of the limits inherent 
in Statist metanarratives of the social body I have described above, and in 
part to appropriate and to concretise what is presented to them is very 
unidimensional terms. In so doing, they create their own essentialism and 
confirm the gap between State and citizenry, but it is a gap of their own 
making and to a certain extent subject to their control: sexuality becomes 
rampant as the citizen’s identification with political processes weakens.
It is left to the disempowered citizenry to exploit this fertile semiotic 
space, verbally and visually, between the past and the present and between 
the State as family (in political rhetoric) and the family as a over-sexed body 
(in popular discourse). Italy is a sexy country, with both men and women 
participating in the metaphorisation of sexuality, as anyone who has spent 
any time there can attest. By appropriating this distinctive metaphoric field, 
citizens divorce themselves from the state’s dry, idealistic, disembodied 
rhetoric of authority, shifting power from the State as “head” to the people 
as “guts” and sexual organs.19 In brief, by appropriating the metaphoric field 
of the body and especially its reproductive function, the citizenry creates an 
acceptable compromise between themselves and the State: the metaphoric 
control of the future (sex = reproduction) is in their hands while the political 
power of the present is in the hands of the elite. In other words, for all the 
avowed republicanism of the Italian political elite, their rhetoric is an exact 
reprise of the rhetoric of the Vatican Counter-Reformation and its politics of 
sexual repression. The failure to overcome these limits forces the elite to use 
naked power as a means of social and political control to a degree that is 
unusual in the Western context, and obliges the citizenry to extol the implied 
inversion of the elite’s identification with “Protestant” and asexual Weberian 
institutions.
My generalisations about the sexualisation of the social body are far 
from hermetic. “ Popular” discourse is far from equally shared among all 
segments of the population. Class distinctions play a major role in how people 
see la Patria and in particular how they appropriate and sexualise this sign. 
Although I cannot do justice to the complexity of local social practices, 
I would like to mention that Italian men and women who primarily identify 
with the upper reaches of the social pyramid (in practice, the bourgeoisie)
19. I would also argue that the Italian obsession with food, as a source o f  the good life, health and 
social w ell-being, is a similar metonymic shift from head to guts.
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are generally very prudish in public when it comes to displaying, in dress 
and in behaviour, overt signs of sexuality and sensuality, in contrast with 
lower middle and working class people. Several hypotheses may be adduced: 
such reserve may simply be a product of social snobbery, as in the old joke 
about the Duchess who belatedly discovers that the poor also fuck, but that 
it’s too good for them -  if they’re doing it, at least they shouldn’t enjoy it so 
much. However, I think the situation is more complex. The bourgeoisie, like 
many other Italians regardless of their class, are patriotic even though many 
of them are very critical of the State and of nazionalità. In fact, their open 
patriotism and pride in their Italian cultural identity (and shame at their Italian 
political identity) is somewhat surprising considering the negative semiotic 
markers with which the bourgeoisie is associated; conservative, priggish, 
repressive and repressed, close-minded, staid, and so forth, as well as the 
fairly recent attacks on their category by, first, the Fascists and, second, 
students and youth in the 1968 uprisings. I would argue that bourgeois 
patriotism vis-à-vis their Patria is in fact the dry, abstract and idealised 
counterpart of the metaphorically sexualised patria of the lower classes. 
The bourgeoisie possess sufficient cultural and especially social capital that 
they can afford to distance themselves from the sexuality of ‘popular’ 
discourse and maintain their relatively privileged position while sharing with 
the “ popular classes” (as they are called in Italian) the same process of 
semiotic distancing from the State by means of la patria and a heavy-handed 
critique of State institutions. However, like the rhetoric of the political field, 
their cultural patriotism and pride are expressed more in terms of traits that 
can be idealised, such as their patriotic support of Italian civiltà, rather than 
in terms that can be immediately traced to the private body projected onto 
public social spaces.
I would also add that, recently, Italian public sexiness seems to be 
lessening among the upper classes (where it was never very strongly 
expressed, as I have said) as Italy becomes more “European” (i.e., politically 
modifying certain standards to be in line with EC laws). I do not think that 
the reduction in sexiness is a result of northern European contamination or 
of Italians imitating northern European behavioural norms. As power becomes 
ever more concentrated in Brussels and Strasbourg in the hands of often 
nameless committees, national governments, especially those national 
governments that were always secondary to Europeanisation (for example, 
Italy, Spain, Greece), become increasingly irrelevant to most people’s lives,
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and the politics of representation shifts (and will continue to shift) accordingly. 
Not surprisingly, television, the virtual homeland of the disempowered, has 
hecome increasingly sexier in the last two or three years.
Conclusion
In conclusion, it is popular to speak of globalisation and its pernicious 
link to the fragilisation of nation-state essentialisms. While it is true that 
liurope is undergoing a  process of Brussellisation as more powers are shifted 
from national governments to nameless, non-elected committees in the EC, 
lhe study of Italian political rhetoric suggests more questions than answers 
about the apparently inevitable disintegration of state control of represen­
tations. Never having successfully used ethnic notions of blood and common 
descent as a unifying glue in its nationalist representations, it is not surprising 
that the Italian State does not invoke them now as their political legitimacy 
becomes ever more ephemeral, nor is it surprising that increasingly 
disempowered citizens develop metaphors of resistance that both incorporate 
and subvert patriarchal images of la Patna's social body by metonymic shifts 
from the head to the centre and therefore appropriate responsibility for social 
reproduction.
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